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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
Instability in the administration of municipalities is a particularly serious problem in the 
Western Cape because of its large number of coalition councils. Coalitions have led to 
frequent changes in local governance and to constant changes in political and 
administrative leadership. Due to the fluidity in local government, the politics of the day 
have become synonymous with back-stabbing, secret agreements and arrangements 
between politicians and political parties wishing to align themselves in such a way as to 
gain control of the councils.1  
 
A municipality is required by the Constitution2 to structure and manage its administration 
and budgets, budgeting and planning processes so as to give priority to the basic needs 
of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the 
community.3 Legislation further prescribes that “a municipality must within its 
administrative and financial capacity establish and organize its administration in a 
manner that would enable the municipality to establish clear relationships, facilitate 
coordination, cooperation and communication between (i) its political structures and 
political office bearers and its administration; (ii) its political structures, political office  
 
                                                 
1
 Faull, J (2008) „How the splintered West will be won.‟ Available at www.hsf.org.za (accessed on 25 May 2011) 
2
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (hereafter Constitution) 
3
 Section 153 (a) Constitution  
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bearers and administration and the local community”.4 It may therefore be argued that a 
municipality subscribing to the abovementioned prescripts should be functioning 
effectively. However, in practice continuous administrative and political instability 
adversely impacts on a municipality‟s capacity to provide service delivery to the 
community. 
 
The 2006 local government elections resulted in only four out of 30 municipalities in the 
Western Cape having a single party with more than 50% of the seats (outright majority). 
The remaining 26 municipalities were governed by coalitions of two or more parties. In 
2001, Parliament introduced floor-crossing legislation which allowed Members of 
Parliament, Members of Provincial Legislatures and local government councillors to 
change their political party (or form a new party) and retains their seats when they did 
so.5 As a result of the 2007 floor-crossing legislation, the number of municipalities with an 
outright majority increased to 7. Power changes continued to occur even after the 2007 
floor-crossing as a result of by-election outcomes or new internal coalition arrangements.  
 
Coalition government in the Western Cape remains a reality following the 18 May 2011 
local government elections:   the Democratic Alliance won 12 municipalities outright, the 
African National Congress won 1, and in 12 municipalities there was no outright winner.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (hereafter Systems Act), section 51 (e). Section 51 covers a range of 
requirements from A - M 
5
 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (2002-08-24). "General Notice of a Bill Amending the 
Constitution 
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Of the 12 last-mentioned municipalities, 7 municipalities produced hung municipalities, 
i.e. Bitou, Witzenberg, Laingsburg, Hessequa, Theewaterskloof, Matzikama and Prince 
Albert.   
 
The constant political changes in municipalities under coalition councils have had three 
negative consequences: 
 
1. The stability of  administration has been negatively affected as a consequence of 
parties refusing to work with senior public servants that were employed by 
outgoing political parties; 
2. Constant changes in the administration cause  serious interruptions in service 
delivery; and 
3. General instability and poor performance promote community protests. 
 
The abovementioned negative consequences suggest that these acts constitute a 
political phenomenon that demands explanation and analysis. 
 
Municipalities are responsible for delivering basic services that are needed to reduce the 
high levels of poverty in the country.  Their ability or inability to deliver those services 
affects the other spheres of government. Stable administration is therefore essential, 
irrespective of changes in political arrangements.  
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This study focuses on the effects on the administration within municipalities in the 
Western Cape where coalitions are fragile. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
Effective, stable administration is crucial for local government to perform its constitutional 
mandate, but there is no “protection” of the continuity in administration where the political 
leadership of the municipality constantly changes. Unlike in other provinces, many 
municipalities in the Western Cape are not governed by a single political party but by 
coalition governments. In many instances, political alliances are forged between parties 
with different ideological and political beliefs. The biggest challenge to these “political 
partners” is to keep the coalition together once it is in power. The instability inherent in 
these coalition arrangements has led to wider instability in the Western Cape 
municipalities and has become a real problem. This study examines the problem of 
unstable administration due to changing coalition governments and proposes possible 
ways to insulate administrations from the adverse effects of coalitions. The study focuses 
on two main questions: 
 
 Whether existing frameworks are sufficient to insulate the administration in 
municipalities from political changes. 
 How best to deal with the appointment of municipal managers as well as 
managers directly accountable to the municipal manager. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
1.3 Literature review  
 
Local government‟s capacity to deliver services is an important indicator of effective local 
governance. There is an extensive body of literature on local government but very little 
scholarship on the correlation between fragile coalition agreements, administrative 
instability and service delivery failures.  
 
Zwelethu Jolobe argues that “the Cape Metro‟s first term in the new system of local 
government was characterized by a crisis of governance and institutional ability. This was 
the consequence of the inability of the major political actors to establish an effective and 
sustainable governance coalition in the aftermath of the 2000 local government elections. 
The result was a prolonged period of political turbulence and institutional instability that 
saw government turnovers and the inauguration of three mayors in a space of three 
years, the effects of the executive instability, and consequent high turnover of senior 
management, has led to the decline of morale within the city‟s civil service.”6 Jolobe 
questioned whether a causal link existed in the relationship between different types of 
political coalitions and political stability.  
 
Shumbana Karume argues that “the downturn to forming vote pooling coalitions is that it 
encourages pre election alliances between parties with very different ideologies. When  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Jolobe, Z, „Things fall apart, can the centre hold?‟ The state of coalition politics in the Cape Metropolitan Council. 
Available at www.hsrcpress.ac.za (accessed on 27 May 2011) 
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parties coalesce solely for the purpose of winning elections, these differences soon begin 
to take their toll, making their collapse once in power, imminent.”7 
 
Both writers are in agreement that keeping coalitions together is difficult and coalition 
failures affect sound administration. That view is supported by a review undertaken by 
the Community Law Centre, UWC, which indicated that “political change in a municipality 
tends to have grave effects on the workings of both its political and administrative 
components. Moreover, these changes occur relatively often in local government; 
general elections, floor-crossing and the reconfiguration of governing coalitions may give 
rise to a change of leadership and management”.8   
 
This study builds on this research by focusing on the problem of insulating the 
administration from the instability caused by coalitions. 
 
1.4 Significance of the study 
 
The study fills a gap in the literature on local government in South Africa by analysing the 
link between fragile coalitions and constant changes in administrations. The study will 
further highlight the need for changes in the appointment of municipal managers. The 
study will provide information that could be used by future students, researchers, 
practitioners, civil servants, the Department of Co-operative Governance (DCoG), the  
                                                 
7
 Karume, S, (2003): 5. „Conceptual understanding of political coalitions in South Africa.‟ Available at 
www.eisa.org.za (Accessed on 31 May 2011)   
8
 De Visser et al (2007): „The quality of local democracies: A study into the functionality of municipal governance 
arrangements‟:  677 
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South African Local Government Association (SALGA), political parties, and any other 
interested organisations that seek some stability in the administrative arm of local 
government.  
 
1.5  Methodology of the study 
 
The research method to be used will be a quantitative and qualitative desktop study. The 
emphasis will be on analysing critically and reviewing current literature and legislation on 
the subject. The reason for adopting this method is that it allows for ascertaining an in-
depth knowledge on the current situation. The writer will focus on observations, 
documents, reports, journals, internet, the Acts and case law as well as his experience as 
an official working in the Department of Local Government in the Western Cape.  
 
1.6 Overview of the chapters 
 
The study is comprised of five chapters: 
 
Chapter two provides an analysis of the political arrangements in the Western Cape 
municipalities from 2006-2011, focusing on the changes in the administration of the 
Western Cape municipalities.  
 
Chapter three examines the legislative requirements and competency frameworks 
guiding municipalities in the appointment of municipal managers and managers directly 
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reporting to the municipal manager, focusing on the appointment criteria, the problems of 
nepotism and cadre deployment, and the need to divorce managerial appointments from 
undue political influence. 
 
Chapter four focuses on national government‟s efforts to insulate administrations. 
 
Chapter five consists of a summary with recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL POSITION OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
MUNICIPALITIES 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines the fragility of coalition agreements in the Western Cape and the 
effect they have had on the stability/instability of municipal administration. These 
alliances were formed when no single party achieved a clear majority after elections. A 
perspective on the current state of Western Cape local political governance will be 
provided with emphasis on the changes in the administrative leadership (municipal 
managers) when political power changes hands. Finally, this chapter will attempt to 
establish the causal link between political change and administrative change. 
 
2.2 Definition of coalitions 
 
In this paper, the concept of coalition has the following definition: “Building political 
coalitions is described as a process of organising parties collectively in pursuit of a 
common goal. The elements or actions that entail this process include, among others, the 
pooling of resources in pursuit of this goal, communication about the goal, forming 
binding commitments concerning this goal and an agreement on the distribution 
arrangement of the product that may result from achieving this goal. The precise actors 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
that make up such political coalitions consist mainly of individual legislators and political 
parties seeking purposely/explicitly to control the executive.”9 
  
2.3 Historical overview 
 
It is important to review the political landscape in order to understand the issues around 
political coalitions. In the 1999 national and provincial elections, KwaZulu-Natal (between 
the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the 
Western Cape (between the African National Congress and the New National Party 
(NNP) were the most contested provinces. Due to a history of political violence in the 
KwaZulu-Natal province, the two major parties saw the need to try and conduct 
responsible and constructive campaigns and to build an atmosphere of peace and 
cooperation both during and after the election period.10 In the Western Cape, the two 
main political formations (NNP and ANC) fought fierce battles and were unable to reach 
or wanting to reach a coalition agreement and were more focused on opposing each 
other than to cooperate in a unity government. 
 
After the 1999 provincial elections, the ANC became the largest party in the province due 
to it amassing 42% of the votes11. However, it became the official opposition due to its 
inability to acquire the required majority of seats in the legislature (50% plus 1). The NNP  
                                                 
9
 Karume, S, (2003): 5  
10
 Nijzink, L, and Jacobs, S, ( 2000) „Provincial and government formation in the Western Cape: The politics of 
polarisation‟: 37- 49 
11
 The 1999 election results are taken from Government Gazette, No. 20201, 11June 1999, Electoral Commission, 
Results, Allocation of Seats and Basis for Determination of seats in respect of the election held on 2 June 1999: 20  
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and Democratic Party (DP) then formed a coalition government and elected their premier 
candidate.  
 
After the 1999 provincial elections, local government was characterised by a crisis of 
governance and institutional instability. This was due to the inability of the major political 
factions to form sustainable local government coalitions. The Western Cape continues to 
experience political turbulence and institutional instability due to constant changes in the 
political leadership. The effects of the political instability cause a high turnover and 
general low morale amongst local government senior managers as they are constantly 
concerned about job security. According to Jolobe, coalition government formation raises 
questions about the relationship between the types of political coalitions and political 
stability.12 
 
2.4 Dynamics of political coalitions  
 
“A political coalition is a temporary alliance of political groups formed in order to achieve 
a common purpose or to engage in some joint activity. The building of coalitions thus 
involves a process in which different parties come together to form a partnership 
collectively in pursuit of a common objective. This process can include the mobilization of 
resources in pursuit of the common goal, the formation of binding decisions and 
commitments concerning the common objective, and agreements on the distribution of 
political resources and patronage that may emerge from the realization of the 
                                                 
12
 Jolobe, Z,  (2007): 79 
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objective.”13 Coalition governance can therefore be viewed as the ability of different 
political affiliations with differing political ideologies, constitutions, manifestos, etc. coming 
together for a common objective.  
 
This section will give attention to Cabinet/executive coalitions and legislative coalitions. 
 
2.4.1 Cabinet / Executive coalitions 
 
A cabinet or executive coalition refers to a Cabinet in a parliamentary government in 
which several parties come together and cooperate.14 “Where there is no clear legislative 
majority - where the winning party after an election only achieves plurality, so producing a 
hung Parliament or municipal council - parties could be forced to come together in order 
to form a collective majority in the legislature and consequently a majority government15, 
e.g. City of Cape Town comprising of the DA, the African Christian Democratic Party 
(ACDP), the Freedom Front Plus (FFP), the African Muslim Party (AMP), the United 
Democratic Movement (UDM), the United Independent Front (UIF), and the Universal 
Party (UP).”16   
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Jolobe, Z,  (2007): 78 
14
 Karume, S, (2003): 5 
15
 Jolobe, S, (2007): 79  
16
 Political Coalition in the Western Cape City of Cape Town after the 2006 elections 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Cabinet coalitions consist of majority coalition cabinets and minority coalition cabinets. 
Majority coalition cabinets consist of parties which gained majority seats in a legislature, 
whereas minority coalition cabinets simply won a plurality but not a majority of seats in 
the legislature, e.g. the 2006 government formation as mentioned above. 
 
2.4.2 Legislative coalitions 
 
These coalitions are formed where parties support each other in parliamentary debates 
and votes, thereby forming partnerships for a particular purpose but still maintaining their 
identity at party level and maintain separate party structures, e.g. the DA/IFP alliance in 
KwaZulu-Natal and the ANC and Minority Front alliance.17 
 
In the above instances it is evident that where parties do not win an outright majority, 
coalitions are formed. These coalitions are negotiated settlements between political 
parties, and the voters that voted them into power have no say over who will form 
coalition governments with whom. This in essence implies that political parties decide on 
forming coalitions without consulting the voters and thus „rob‟ voters of the exercising of 
their democratic rights. 
     
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Karume, S, (2003): 5 and Jolobe, Z, (2007):  80 
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2.5 Political dynamics in the Western Cape municipalities 
 
After the 2006 local government elections, only four of the 30 municipalities in the 
Western Cape were governed by parties with an outright majority, i.e. Hessequa (DA), 
Bitou (ANC), Swartland (DA) and Overstrand (DA)18. The result of this was a politically 
unstable political environment in local government in the Western Cape. Most 
municipalities entered into coalition arrangements where fierce negotiations and trade-
offs were undertaken to ensure that a winner-takes-all phenomenon occurred.19 
 
During 2007 only ten municipal councils20 could be formed with a single party in 
government. The levels of instability, however, increased substantially in the rest of the 
municipalities during the floor-crossing period, with some municipalities changing political 
hands almost on a quarterly basis. 
 
It was during these turbulent times that other political actors emerged and voters decided 
to give newer parties a chance, which split the votes even further. “Due to the inability of 
the majority of municipalities to gain an outright majority, the majority were hung councils,  
forcing the formation of political coalition in order to make up the 51% threshold needed 
to form stable majority executives. However, the important difference from the 2000 local  
 
                                                 
18
 Information supplied by the Legislative Support sub-directorate at the Western Cape Department of Local 
Government 
19
 Where a political party won the majority of the votes but did not attain an outright majority (50% plus one) it did 
not mean that they were governing in those municipalities. 
20
 Information supplied by the Legislative Support sub-directorate at the Western Cape Department of Local 
Government.  
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elections is that there have not been any electoral coalitions, but rather executive and 
legislative coalitions forged as a result of hung councils.”21   
 
The table below clearly illustrates the political formations in the Western Cape 
Municipalities since 2005.22 
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DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
ACDP 
UDM 
DA 
ID 
ACDP 
UDM 
DA 
ID 
ACDP 
UDM 
DA 
ID 
ACDP 
West Coast DC DA ANC 
ID 
ANC 
ID 
ANC DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
DA 
ID 
Matzikama ANC DA 
ID 
ANC 
ID 
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ID 
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DA 
ID 
SAFPA 
DA 
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DA 
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DA 
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ID 
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ID 
IND 
                                                 
21
 Jolobe, Z, (2007): 91 
22
 Information supplied by the Legislative Support sub-directorate at the Western Cape Department of Local 
Government.  
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Langeberg DA ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC 
Overberg DM ANC ANC ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
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VP 
ICOSA 
VP 
ICOSA 
VP 
ICOSA 
VP 
ICOSA 
VP 
ICOSA 
VP 
ICOSA 
NPP 
ICOSA 
Kannaland ANC DA 
ID 
ICOSA 
NPP NPP NPP NPP 
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NPP 
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NPP 
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ANC 
NPP 
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Hessequa ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC 
Mossel Bay ANC DA 
ICOSA 
DA DA DA DA DA DA DA DA DA 
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ACDP 
VP 
DA 
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ACDP 
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DA 
ID 
ACDP 
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DA 
ID 
ACDP 
VP 
DA 
ID 
ACDP 
VP 
DA 
ID 
ACDP 
VP 
DA 
ID 
ACDP 
VP 
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ACDP 
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ACDP 
ANC 
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Oudtshoorn ANC DA 
ID 
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ID 
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DA 
ID 
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ANC 
DA 
ID 
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DA 
ID 
ANC 
DA 
ID 
ANC 
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ID 
ANC 
DA 
ID 
ANC 
DA 
ID 
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Bitou ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC 
Knysna ANC ANC 
KFOR
UM 
ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC 
Central Karoo DM ANC DA 
ICOSA 
LAING
SB 
- ANC ANC ANC 
NPP 
ICOSA 
ANC 
NPP 
ICOSA 
ANC ANC ANC ANC 
Laingsberg ANC DA 
LAING
SB 
ANC 
DA 
ANC 
DA 
ANC 
DA 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
ANC 
NPP 
Prince Albert ANC DA 
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DA 
ANC 
DA 
ANC 
DA 
ANC 
DA 
ANC 
DA 
ANC 
DA 
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DA 
ANC 
DA 
ANC 
DA 
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Beaufort West ANC DA 
ICOSA 
- ANC 
DA 
ANC 
DA 
ANC 
NPP 
ICOSA 
ANC 
NPP 
ICOSA 
ANC 
ICOSA 
ANC 
ICOSA 
ANC 
ICOSA 
ANC 
ICOSA 
 
 
The above table shows the effect that coalitions have had on the political governance in 
municipalities in the period 2005 – 2011. The table clearly illustrates the fact that most 
municipalities were governed by more than one political party. The effect that the 
constant political changes had on the administration, especially with regard to the 
appointment of municipal managers, is illustrated below. 
 
During the period 2005 - 2011, only 5 out of the 30 municipalities in the Western Cape 
had no turnover in municipal managers. Fifteen municipalities had 2 - 3 municipal 
managers/acting municipal managers, and 10 municipalities had 4 or more municipal 
managers/acting municipal managers over the same period.   
 
Most municipal managers were either suspended or faced disciplinary hearings. In many 
cases municipal managers were given golden handshakes to make way for preferred 
incumbents. This occurred mostly where political power shifted and politicians refused to 
work with municipal managers who were appointed by the previous political regimes. The 
most notable case in the Western Cape was the Mgoqi matter, which went to court over a 
dispute about the validity of the extension of the contract of employment of Mr Mgoqi by  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
the mayor of the Cape Metro at that time, Ms N Mfeketo.23 Ms N Mfeketo unilaterally 
extended the contract of Mr Mgoqi (municipal manager of the City of Cape Town) prior to 
the DA taking control over the City of Cape Town. The DA challenged the extension of 
the contract based on the fact that it was procedurally unfair and also owing to the fact 
that they wanted to appoint their own municipal manager.  
 
It is also important to note that most municipalities that experienced constant municipal 
manager changes either received support from the provincial government or are currently 
under investigation. Below are some examples of these municipalities.  
 
Saldanha Bay Municipality: Since 2005, the municipality has had no fewer than 6 
municipal managers and or acting municipal managers. It was during this time that the 
municipality was plagued with allegations of political turmoil and administrative concerns. 
On a daily basis the municipality was being reported on in the local media, with citizens 
complaining of inefficiencies and general disregard for their concerns. On 8 September 
2008, a team from the Province was deployed to assist the municipality and to draft a 
turnaround strategy. 
 
Stellenbosch Municipality: The municipality has had no fewer than 6 municipal managers 
and/or acting municipal managers since 2005.  President Zuma recently requested24 the  
 
 
                                                 
23
 Mgoqi v City of Cape Town and Another, in re: City of Cape Town v Mgoqi and Another [2006] JOL 17349 (C) 
para 104-107. 
24
 Proclamation No R3 GG No 33722, 14 January 2011 
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Special Investigating Unit to investigate fraud and corruption in the municipality and the 
matter is currently being investigated. 
 
Swellendam Municipality: The municipality has had no fewer than 5 municipal managers 
and or acting municipal managers since 2005. The Standing Committee on Governance, 
in line with its constitutional mandate of the Provincial Legislature to perform oversight 
over the processes and affairs of local government, held a public meeting regarding 
service delivery issues in the Swellendam Municipality on Thursday, 19 March 2009. The 
meeting dealt with the Integrated Development Plans (IDP); the 2005/06 and 2006/07 
Auditor General‟s Reports of the Municipality and service delivery in general. 
 
George Municipality: The municipality has had no fewer than 5 municipal managers and 
or acting municipal managers since 2005 and is also under investigation by the Special 
Investigating Unit. 
 
Oudtshoorn Municipality: The provincial government intervened in the municipality in 
200725 in terms of section 139 of the Constitution because of allegations of 
maladministration, corruption, non-compliance with statutory obligations and serious 
malpractice which were ascribed to political instability and inexperienced political 
leadership. An administrator (Mr Louis Scheepers) was then appointed by the MEC 
responsible for local government, Mr R Dyantyi, to oversee the municipality and to  
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 Parliament ATC No 102 – 2007, 12 September 2007 
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formulate a turnaround strategy. The appointment for six months was from 19 March – 
September 2007. The municipality is also under investigation by the Special Investigating 
Unit.26. 
 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
 
From the data in the above tables we can see that the constant political changes and 
fragile coalition arrangements have had a negative effect on municipal administration, in 
particular the stability of municipal managers. The data shows a correlation between 
constant political changes and frequent changes in municipal managers. In some 
municipalities, the municipal manager post was filled by 3 or more incumbents in a period 
of 1 to 5 years.  
 
Deputy Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), Yunus 
Carrim, noted that it appears that in far too many cases the problem is caused by political 
interference in the appointment or suspension of municipal managers. For example, 
there are cases of municipalities in which municipal managers or other managers are 
politically senior to the mayor. He also pointed out that effective management, leadership 
and oversight are not possible under these circumstances.27 Wooldridge argues that 
there is an urgent need to increase national government‟s capacity to regulate and 
                                                 
26
 Proclamation No R6 GG No 34001, 4 February 2011 
27
 Carrim, Y, (2009). Accelerating Service Delivery and Management Development. Available at www.cogta.gov.za 
(Accessed on 8 June 2011): 3 
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monitor the system of political appointments of, and local governments capacity to 
implement it.28 
 
Constant political regime changes have left the administration in limbo, and have often 
divided the workforce according to party political affiliations. The current volatile political 
situation is cause for concern as everyone appears to be in expectation on whether the 
next power shift will happen. In the medium to long term, this situation will become 
untenable and a need to protect the administration from political changes seems the only 
obvious answer at this time. The frequency with which municipal managers are 
suspended and/or fired soon after political change occurs suggests that getting rid of 
individuals has come to supersede in importance concerns about employing and 
retaining skilled professionals. The next chapter focuses on the appointment of municipal 
managers and managers directly accountable to the municipal manager, with emphasis 
on the legal framework and competency requirements to enforce compliance. 
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 Wooldridge, D, (2008) Consolidating Developmental Local Government: Lessons from the South African 
Experience: 475 
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CHAPTER 3: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter focused on the constant political changes in some Western Cape 
municipalities and the causal effect that this has had on the administration and 
specifically the municipal manager.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the legal framework guiding certain 
organs of the municipality, with specific emphasis on those provisions relating to the 
administration and its link with the council, proposed changes to insulate the 
administration from political interference, the criteria for appointing municipal managers 
and managers directly reporting to the municipal, and the problems of nepotism and 
deployment of cadres. 
 
3.2 Constitutional provisions 
 
The Constitution provides for the regulation of municipal administration in two ways: 
“Firstly, it extends municipal autonomy to the internal affairs of the municipality. Secondly, 
it provides for a rich set of values and principles that guide municipal administration.”29 
There are currently no legislative provisions dealing with coalitions per se. In terms of the 
Constitution, the executive and legislative authority of a municipality vests in its municipal 
                                                 
29
 Steytler, N, and de Visser, J, (2007). Local Government Law of South Africa: 8-5 
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council.30 The organisation of the administration31 as well as the basic values and 
principles governing public administration32 specifically deal with the functioning of the 
administration.  
 
The Constitution33 states that a municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, 
the local government affairs of its community. This is further amplified in the Systems 
Act34 and receives further protection when the Constitution35 is read together with the 
Systems Act36, which states that a municipality must do its work without undue 
interference. 
 
The Constitution further stipulates that a municipality must structure and manage its 
administration37 and may employ personnel that are necessary for the effective 
performance of its functions.38 In essence two essential things are important here: one is 
that local government is an employer and the second is that local government can make 
its own appointments and decide on conditions of employment. “In fact, section 195(5) of 
the Constitution allows for different laws for various sectors, administrations or institutions 
in public administration.”39  
 
                                                 
30
 S 151(2) Constitution. Also see item 18 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (hereafter 
Structures Act) 
31
 S 51 Systems Act 
32
 S 195 Constitution  
33
 S 151(3) Constitution 
34
 S 4(a) Systems Act 
35
 S 151 (4) Constitution 
36
 S 4(b) Systems Act 
37
 S 153(a) Constitution 
38
 S 160 (d)Constitution 
39
 Ntliziwana, P, (2011). Professionalisation of Local Government: Legal avenues for enforcing compliance with 
competency requirements: 24 
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Even though provincial governments are responsible for the recruitment, appointment, 
promotion, transfer and dismissal of members of the public service in their 
administrations, this must occur within a uniform national framework.40 This aspect of 
municipal autonomy is unlikely to be long-lived, however, as legislation towards a single 
public service, including local government, is on the cards.41  
 
3.3 Legislative framework dealing with the municipal administration 
 
The Municipal Systems Act42, the Municipal Structures Act43 and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act44  govern the municipal administration.  Section 4(2) of the Systems Act 
deals with the municipality‟s financial and administrative capacity, section 6 with the 
duties of a municipality‟s administration and section 51 with how a municipality‟s 
administration should be established within its administrative and financial capacity.   
In terms of section 7245 of the Systems Act, the Minister may make regulations46 to 
regulate municipal staff matters and issue guidelines.47 Ntliziwana48 notes that “the fully  
fledged guidelines are yet to be issued and it appears that the National Minister is 
awaiting finalisation of the Local Government System Amendment Bill, whereafter the 
guidelines will hopefully be issued”. The Local Government Systems Amendment Act 
                                                 
40
 Steytler and de Visser (2007): 8-5 
41
 Steytler and de Visser (2007): 8-5 
42
 Systems Act 
43
 Structures Act  
44
 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (hereafter MFMA) 
45
 S 72(1)(a)(b) Systems Act 
46
 Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers Directly 
Accountable to Municipal Manager‟s. A framework for competency requirements, GN 805, GG 29089 (2006) 
47
 Draft Competency Guidelines for Municipal Managers and Managers Directly Accountable to Municipal Managers. 
Establishment of job evaluation systems and measurement of staff performance management, GN 347, GG 
29723(2006) 
48
 Ntliziwana (2011): 27 
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was promulgated in July 2011 and goes a long way in addressing some of the challenges 
confronting local government. 
 
In terms of the Structures Act, a municipal council must appoint a municipal manager 
who is the head of administration and also the accounting officer for the municipality, 
and, when necessary, an acting municipal manager.49 It goes on to stipulate that a 
person appointed as municipal manager must have the relevant skills and expertise to 
perform the duties associated with that post.50 “Bearing in mind that there are 283 
municipalities (nine of which, the metropolitan areas, contribute 70% of our country‟s 
GDP), there was just not enough leadership and competence to go round, which put our 
municipalities at severe risk of not being able to perform. Consequently, many of our 
municipalities have been bedevilled by infighting, as mayors, councillors, party ward 
councillors and managers compete in a scramble to meet community backlogs and 
needs. Mayors‟ and municipal managers‟ heads have rolled regularly in this unstable 
municipal environment.”51 
 
The abovementioned legislation is further complemented by the Local Government: 
Municipal Finance Management Act (hereinafter referred to as the MFMA) which states 
that the object of the Act is to secure sound and sustainable management of the fiscal 
and financial affairs of municipalities and municipal entities by establishing norms and 
standards and other requirements.52 “The Regulations in terms of the MFMA have been 
                                                 
49
 S 82 (1)(a)(b) Structures Act 
50
 S 82 (2) Structures Act 
51
 Hasswell, R, (2009). The Municipal Imperative: 16 
52
 S 2 MFMA 
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promulgated as Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act: Municipal 
Regulations on Minimum Competency Levels53 (hereinafter referred to as Competency 
Regulations). While the Performance Regulations in terms of the Systems Act provide for 
a generic managerial competency framework for municipal managers and section 56 
managers, the Competency Regulations provide for general and minimum competency 
levels for financial and supply chain management officials. The National Treasury has 
also issued guidelines for the competency levels of each of the municipal financial and 
supply chain management officials to explain the Competency Regulations. In this 
regard, there exist separate guidelines for the competency levels of accounting officers 
(municipal managers), section 56 managers, chief financial officers, finance officials at 
middle management level, and for head of supply chain management and supply chain 
senior managers.”54  
 
The focus will now shift to the appointment of municipal managers and managers directly 
reporting to the municipal manager, with specific emphasis on the appointment of the top 
six positions, nepotism and deployment of cadres. 
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 GN R 493, GG 29967 (2007) 
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3.4 The appointment of municipal managers and managers directly 
accountable to municipal managers 
 
The appointment of municipal managers and of managers directly accountable to the 
municipal manager is regulated by the Structures Act55 as well as the Systems Act.56 The 
municipal manager may be regarded as the interface between the administration and the 
council. As accounting officer, the municipal manager carries the overall responsibility for 
the municipality‟s financial affairs.57 
Due to the vast array of responsibilities expected of the municipal manager, it is 
imperative that the municipal manager and managers directly accountable to the 
municipal manager have the relevant skills and expertise to perform the duties 
associated with their positions.58 The critical section 56 managers requiring the 
qualifications, skills and experience that need to be filled by a municipality include the 
Chief Financial Officer, Town Engineer, Town Planner, Human Resource Manager and 
the Communications Manager.59   
 
Section 160(1) (c) of the Constitution provides that municipalities may employ personnel 
who are necessary for the effective performance of its functions. Section 82 of the 
Municipal Structures Act furthermore provides that only a municipal council can appoint a 
municipal manager. The challenge for local government will come with the introduction of  
 
                                                 
55
 S 82 Structures Act 
56
 S 56 Systems Act 
57
 Steytler and de Visser (2007): 8-20 
58
 S 82(3) Structures Act 
59
 Hetherington (2010). Getting the right top six: 48 
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the Single Public Service Bill, which seeks to “integrate the public service and local 
government under the same legislative framework, to strengthen coordination between 
the spheres of government, eliminate fragmentation and make seamless service delivery 
a reality”60. This Bill will provide huge challenges for local government, as currently the 
employment and dismissal of municipal managers and managers directly accountable to 
the municipal manager are council prerogatives whereas public service employees 
(provincial and national) are guided by the Public Service Conditions of Service.     
 
As the accounting officer of the municipality, the municipal manager is responsible and 
accountable for proper and diligent compliance with the MFMA.61 The MFMA prescribes 
that the accounting officer (municipal manager), senior managers, the chief financial 
officer and other financial officials of a municipality must meet the prescribed financial 
management competency levels.62 As was stated above, the National Minister has also 
implemented Draft Competency Guidelines for municipal managers and managers 
directly accountable to municipal managers as well as the Local Government: Municipal 
Performance Regulations for municipal managers and managers directly accountable to 
the municipal manager. 
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 Issa, A, (2009). Single public service: Challenges ahead: 427 
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3.5 The Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for 
municipal managers and managers directly accountable to municipal 
managers 
 
The focus of this section shifts away from the Performance Regulations63 to the 
requirements for the position of municipal manager as contained therein. They specify 
that the job purpose should provide for: 
 
1) leadership and direction of the administration of the municipality through effective 
strategies to fulfil the objects of local government provided for in the Constitution, 
1996, and any other legislative framework that governs local government; 
2) fostering relationships between the municipal council and the administrative arm of 
the municipality as well as other key stakeholders; and 
3) creating an environment that defines the purpose and role of local government as 
a means to involve people in shaping the future of communities. 
 
3.5.1 Main accountabilities 
 
As the head of administration and the accounting officer of the municipality, the 
municipal manager is responsible and accountable for, and performs, the following 
functions: 
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a) municipal transformation and organisation development; 
b) basic service delivery; 
c) local economic development; 
d) municipal financial viability and management; and 
e) good governance and public participation. 
 
3.5.2 Inherent requirements of the job 
 
The job description must provide for- 
 
1) a recognised B degree in public administration or relevant fields; 
2) a minimum of five (5) years‟ experience at senior management level; 
3) the core competencies which must distinguish between core managerial 
competencies and core occupational competencies; and 
4) core occupational competencies providing for knowledge, skills, 
communication and exceptional and dynamic creativity to improve the 
functioning of the municipality. 
 
National Treasury has issued guidelines in terms of the competency requirements64. In 
terms of the guidelines, a person to be appointed as municipal manager should posses a  
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 Guidelines for Municipal Competency Levels: Accounting Officers: Municipal Regulations on Minimum 
Competency Levels (Guidelines on Accounting Officers Competency Levels) Available at 
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Bachelor‟s degree in a relevant field plus a certificate in Municipal Financial 
Management. 
 
The key issue for this chapter is not the competency standards per se, an issue where 
research exists, but the question – Who appoints the municipal manager and other 
managers? 
 
3.6 Who appoints the municipal manager and Section 56 managers? 
 
In terms of the Structures Act, a municipal council must appoint a municipal manager 
who is the head of administration and also the accounting officer for the municipality, 
and, when necessary, an acting municipal manager. The Structures Act furthermore 
requires of the executive committee or executive mayor to submit a report and 
recommendation to the municipal council on the appointment and conditions of service of 
the municipal manager and a head of a department of the municipality.65 The 
constitutionality of the statutory instruction to appoint a municipal manager was first 
challenged in Executive Council of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development66, on the basis of municipal autonomy, in particular the 
municipality‟s right to decide over personnel appointments.67  
 
 
                                                 
65
 S 30 (c) Structures Act 
66
 Executive Council of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development of the 
Republic of South Africa; Executive Council of Kwazulu-Natal v  President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
1999 (12) BCLR 1360 (CC) at para 107-109 
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In Mbana v Mnqunma Municipality68 the court had to decide whether the executive mayor 
bound the municipality to the employment contract with Mbana. The facts in this case 
were that Mr Mbana, after an interview for the municipal manager‟s post, received a letter 
of appointment from the executive mayor. The mayor subsequently entered into a 5-year 
employment contract with him on behalf of the municipality. His contract was terminated 
a month after his appointment due to the fact that the municipality argued that the 
executive mayor had no authority to enter into contract with Mr Mbana on behalf of the 
municipality. The court referred to section 160 of the Constitution, read together with 
section 82 of the Structures Act and concluded that the municipal council, and no other 
person, has the right to appoint the municipal manager.69   
 
In the matter of Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality70 (hereinafter the 
Manana matter), the court had to rule on the legality of the appointment of Mr Manana to 
the position of Manager: Legal Services and the adjustment of his salary accordingly. 
The Court in this matter argued that the resolution of the municipal council to appoint Mr 
Manana and to adjust his salary accordingly, was invalid as the power to appoint 
employees vested in the municipal manager and not in the municipal council. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) confirmed that in accordance with section 151(2) of the 
Constitution the executive authority of a municipality does not vest in its municipal 
manager, but it vests in its municipal council. 
 
 
                                                 
68
 Mbana v Mnqunma Municipality 2004(1) BCLR 83 (Tk) 
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The judgment in Mgoqi v City of Cape Town71 supported the interpretation that the power 
to appoint the municipal manager was a prerogative of the municipal council that could 
not be delegated. “Firstly, the Court pointed at the absence of any reference to the 
appointment of the municipal manager in section 60 (1) of the Systems Act, which 
provides that the determination of the municipal manager‟s remuneration, benefits and 
conditions of employment may be delegated to an executive committee or executive 
mayor. Secondly, section 30(5) of the Structures Act, which requires the executive to 
submit a report on the appointment of the municipal manager before the council 
proceeds with an appointment, stands in the way of delegating the power to the 
executive. Thirdly, with reference to the above duties of the municipal manager, the 
notion of the municipal manager as a „key structure of a municipality and not merely a 
personnel appointment as contemplated in section 160 (1)(d) of the Constitution.‟72  
 
In the Mlokoti v Amathole District Municipality73 the Court was requested to review the 
decision of the Amathole District Municipality in the appointment process of the position 
of municipal manager. Dr Mlokoti and Adv Zenzile applied for the municipal manager 
position and both their names were submitted to council for a decision. The panellists 
scored Dr Mlokoti higher than Adv Zenzile and it appears that he was the preferred 
candidate. The Regional Executive Committee (REC) of the ANC instructed its caucus to 
appoint Adv Zenzile, which it subsequently did. Adv Zenzile was then appointed as the  
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municipal manager after which Dr Mlokoti requested reasons from the municipality on 
why he was not appointed into the position. Dr Mlokoti then sought a review by the High 
Court on the decision of the municipality not to appoint him into the municipal manager 
position. The Court ruled that “…an unsurpation of the powers of [Amathole]‟s council by 
a political body which, on the papers, does not appear even to have had sight of the 
documents relevant to the selection process including the findings of the interview panel. 
In my view, the involvement of the REC of the ANC in the circumstances described in 
[the letter] constituted an unauthorised and unwarranted intervention in the affairs of 
[Amathole]‟s council.”74 The Court in this judgment was clearly not happy with the ANC‟s 
involvement in the appointment process and subsequently ordered that Dr Mlokoti be 
appointed as the municipal manager.  
 
The significance of these decisions is that the courts have clearly highlighted that 
competence and requirements for the post should be the overriding factor in 
appointments, not political allegiance and/or political interference in administrative 
processes. 
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3.7 Deployment of cadres 
 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary75 defines „cadre‟ as “a group of activists in a communist or 
any revolutionary organisation; a basic unit esp. of servicemen, forming a nucleus for 
expansion when necessary”. It defines „deployment‟ as “a cause to spread out from a 
column into a line; spread out into this way; bring into effective action”. Many candidates 
are not appointed despite their high levels of competence and experience because 
municipalities make appointments on the basis of political and family ties.76 Hoffman 
observes that the ethos is that loyal cadres do what the party expects of them, not what 
they want to do for the party.77 He goes further to note that opacity, cronyism and 
patronage displace openness, fairness and accountability when smoke-filled back rooms 
are the venue for the appointment (deployment) of members of the public administration.  
 
The Deputy Minister of CoGTA, Yunus Carrim, stated that in some municipalities the 
rules of accountability and the rule of law were superseded by patronage and loyalty to 
the party. He stressed further that in these places you end up with the wrong people in 
municipal office, the wrong culture taking root, and little hope for professionally run 
administration.78  
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 A consequence of cadre deployment is that unqualified and incompetent people are 
placed in positions of great responsibility and then they fail to deliver on the service 
mandate of the government. According to Hoffman, section 195 of the Constitution is also 
relevant, providing as it does that public administration at all levels of government be 
governed by the democratic values and principles that efficient, economic and effective 
use of resources must be promoted and that good human resource management and 
career development practices, to maximise human potential, must be cultivated.79  
 
According to Ntliziywana the deployment of cronies with little or no capacity is related to 
the evident skills deficit and undermines the new status of local government, frustrating 
its local developmental and service delivery mandates.80 This is further amplified by 
Wooldridge81 who states that a poorly managed system of political appointments has 
significant potential to destabilise local government. She further quotes Verheijen and 
Rabrenovic, noting that the presence of a stable and professional administration is a key 
requirement to keep state affairs moving in situations characterised by high levels of 
political discontinuity, such as state transitions, unstable coalition governments or 
frequent executive reshuffles.  
 
Deputy Minister Yunus Carrim stressed that developmental local government could not 
work without skilled, capable and ethical people serving the citizens of this country to the 
best of their abilities.82  
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A summary of the interchanging role of the Council and Executive Mayor in relation to the 
administration will now be discussed. 
 
3.8 Council 
 
The need for a separation of powers between council, the executive and the 
administration is intended to strengthen the oversight function of councillors and ensuring 
that each organ can continue with its work without undue influence and hindrances. The 
executive mayor (executive head) and municipal manager (administrative head) are the 
main links between the administration and the council. The administration is responsible 
for the day-to-day operations of the municipality as well as the executing authority of 
council decisions. If this separation is properly managed then there should not be any 
conflict of interests, as each organ will know exactly what their roles and functions are 
without anyone feeling that their power are being usurped. 
 
3.9 Executive mayor  
 
The executive mayor is the political head of the executive and plays a strategic role in 
identifying the needs of the municipality.83 The mayor is also responsible, for reviewing 
programmes and services, for ensuring that priority areas are addressed and for 
recommending the best possible strategies to ensure service delivery. In terms of 
legislation, the executive mayor is responsible for monitoring the management of the 
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municipality‟s administration in accordance with the directions of the municipal council.84 
In this regard it would be expected of the executive mayor to articulate council decisions 
to the administrative head (municipal manager) and to oversee the actual implementation 
of council decisions by the administration. This would require of the executive mayor to 
be the interface between the administration and the council and to have the skills and 
expertise to monitor compliance. This in itself requires an astute personality that can rise 
above party politics to ensure not only that council decisions are implemented but also 
that the administration is protected from undue influences. 
 
3.10 Managing the administrative and political dichotomy 
 
The appointment of managers directly accountable to a municipal manager is contained 
in section 56 of the Systems Act.85 Local public administration is governed by the 
democratic values and principles embodied in section 195 (1) of the Constitution86. The 
municipal manager is the head of administration and as such is responsible for ensuring 
of the policy implementation of the municipal council87. The municipal manager is 
appointed by council and herein lies the dilemma, as most appointments are thought to 
be political by nature. 
 
The municipal council is responsible for appointing a manager directly accountable to the 
municipal manager, after consultation with the municipal manager. It is a requirement 
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that a person appointed as a manager must have the relevant skills and expertise to 
perform the duties associated with the post in question, taking into account the protection 
or advancement of persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. The High Court in the Mlokoti judgement88 ruled unequivocally on the 
alleged practice of cadre deployment and interference by political parties in the 
appointment process of council. This matter will be further discussed and analysed in 
chapter four of this research paper. 
 
Cooper89 argues that the job of the public administrator is more difficult in that he or she 
operates in highly charged political environments in which the rights, duties and 
obligations of the ordinary citizen more often than not result in significant tension with the 
elected representatives and those that advise them. Scheepers90 asserts that 
contemporary South Africa makes a pertinent question relevant, namely, should public 
administrators emphasise efficiency and neutral competence, or representivity and 
political responsiveness.      
 
The Systems Act is quite clear that there should be a clear distinction between the 
political and administrative arm of local government and prohibits a councillor from giving 
direct instructions to the administration, except where the law provides91. In terms of 
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section 119, as contained in Chapter 12, certain offences and penalties are prescribed 
where a councillor attempts to influence the administration as well as the administration 
acceding to such requests92. The writer is not aware of any case in the Western Cape 
where a municipality invoked this provision, and this raises questions on its applicability.  
 
3.11 Concluding remarks 
 
There is an inevitable reliability that the lines between the administration and councilors 
become blurred and at times may compromise the ability to co-operate and co-exist. The 
ideal would be for councilors to refrain from interfering in the work of the administration 
and for the administration to carry out policy decisions of the municipal council diligently 
without trying to divert it to their own interest. Graham stated that most of the literature on 
the political-administrative dichotomy seems to be focused on dispelling the idea that 
such a dichotomy exists.”93  Wooldridge mentioned that “a discussion of the legislative 
framework for regulating the political-administrative interface must be prefaced by a 
caution that there are limits to what can be effected through legislative instruments.”94 It 
appears that what is required is a legislative framework regulating this political-
administrative interface that has the support of the majority political parties to ensure its 
implementation and adherence.  
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CHAPTER 4: GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO DEAL WITH INSULATING 
THE ADMINISTRATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we focused on the appointment of municipal managers and 
managers directly accountable to the municipal manager. What was evident in the 
preceding chapter was the fact that the person with the right expertise and knowledge 
should be appointed to these important positions. We also attempted to indicate the need 
for regulating the political–administrative interface. It is important to note that legislating 
every action will not yield the required results.  
 
The Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) compiled a 
report in 2009 (State of Local Government in South Africa)95 due to the fact that local 
government systems were showing signs of distress. This and other initiatives by 
government will now be discussed and critically analysed in this chapter. 
 
4.2 State of Local Government in South Africa Overview Report  
 
The State of Local Government Report was produced after assessments were done in all 
nine provinces between April and August 2009. The assessments were designed to 
ascertain the root causes of the current state of distress in many of the country‟s 
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municipalities.96 The report highlighted that political leadership is a defining characteristic 
of an effectively functioning municipality. The report pointed to the following reasons for 
distress in municipal governance: 
 
a) tensions between the political and administrative interface; 
b) poor ability of many councillors to deal with the demands of local government; 
c) insufficient separation of powers between political parties and municipal councils; 
d) lack of clear separation between the legislative and the executive; 
e) inadequate accountability measures and support systems and resources  for local 
democracy; and 
f) poor compliance with the legislative and regulatory frameworks for municipalities. 
 
The report also highlighted that the political–administrative interface resulted in 
factionalism and a battle over access to resources rather than ideological or policy 
differences. “The lack of values, principles or ethics in these cases indicates that there 
are officials and public representatives for whom public service is not a concern, but 
accruing wealth at the expense of poor communities is priority.”97 Other concerns 
highlighted in the report alluded to: 
 
a) the absence of rules or procedures for dismissals, suspensions and disciplinary 
cases; 
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b) non-conclusion of performance agreements by municipal mangers and managers 
directly accountable to the municipal manager; 
c) competency for some senior and middle management level posts not being 
regulated (e.g. technical heads of infrastructure, CFO‟s etc.) 
d) incidence of irregular or inappropriate appointment, e.g. in one municipality a 
former tea lady was appointed as CFO.  
 
4.3 Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS) 
 
The LGTAS was informed by the State of Local Government Report98 and the Local 
Government Indaba and was endorsed by Cabinet in December 2009.99 The aim of the 
LGTAS was to mobilise government and society at large to deal with the factors 
undermining Local Government and to restore the communities, confidence in the 
country‟s municipalities, while improving their performance.100 The LGTAS highlighted 
some areas of concern which included serious leadership and governance challenges in 
municipalities and political parties that undermine the integrity and functioning of 
municipal councils through intra- and inter-party conflicts and inappropriate interference 
in councils and administrations. Some of these concerns were classified in short term and 
long term plans. We have already seen some progress being made with the short term 
plans, which included certain amendments to the Systems Act.  
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4.4 Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Bill, 2010 
 
The object of the Local Government Systems Amendment Bill is to amend certain 
provisions of the Local Government Systems Act (32 0f 2000). Some of these 
amendments will be highlighted and critiqued below. In terms of the amendments, a 
person appointed as municipal manager or acting municipal manager must at least have 
the skills, expertise, competencies and qualifications  prescribed by regulation.  
 
In its entirety most of the amendments are positive moves to eliminate the chances of 
unqualified people taking up municipal managers‟ positions purely based on their political 
affiliation. The amendments should have required of municipal councils to report the 
outcome of the interview process101 and proposed candidate to the MEC for review within 
seven (7) days, after which if the MEC do not respond, it will be assumed that the 
vacancy may be offered to the preferred candidate.  This will allow for a process of 
checks and balances and certain questionable decisions being addressed prior to making 
an offer and entering into lengthy and costly legal processes after a person has been 
appointed into the position of municipal manager. 
 
In terms of the new proposed amendment102 dealing with the waiving of requirements for 
appointment of municipal managers, I am of the view that this allows for abuse and non-
commitment by municipal councils due to the fact that they are allowed to apply to the 
Minister to waive certain requirements. As the previous chapter showed, the post of 
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municipal manager is a complex one that requires someone who fulfills all of the 
requirements, and this should be non-negotiable.  
 
In terms of the amendment of section 56 (1)(a), the municipal council, after consultation 
with the municipal manager appoints a manager, directly accountable to the municipal 
manager. This section gives a political feel to the process of appointment of managers‟ 
directly accountable to the municipal manager. It would have been ideal to erase this 
item and to amend it in such a way that the municipal manager accepts full responsibility 
and accountability for the appointment of S56 managers‟. Unless a municipal manager 
has the power to hire and fire staff, s/he cannot be in control of the organisation, and 
prevailing centres of power remain a risk103. Council‟s role will merely be to check that 
processes have been followed and that the best candidate is appointed. This will be more 
in line with council‟s role of overseeing the administration and by not getting involved in it.  
 
In terms of the changes proposed in section 57 (A), which deals with “employment by 
other municipalities of dismissed municipal employees and municipal employees who are 
subjected to a disciplinary process”, the Bill proposes certain fundamental changes but 
then raises more questions than answers with section 57 (A)(4&5)104. In point 4 it is 
stated that the Minister may prescribe acts of misconduct in respect of which no period 
need expire before a person may again be employed in a municipality. The writer is of 
the opinion that if sufficient safeguards are built in to deal extensively with the misconduct 
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hearing and appeals procedures that point 4 and 5 would become superfluous and 
become an escape clause for those wanting to abuse the system.  
 
If the legislators want to ensure that employees found guilty of misconduct do not jump 
from municipality to municipality, they should rather ensure that employees with charges 
pending receive swift justice that finds them either guilty (not eligible for re-employment at 
another municipality) or innocent (able to apply for another vacancy at a municipality). 
We cannot have a process where justice is delayed and employees are then unable to 
move in the absence of justice being served. We should be cognisant of the fact that our 
municipalities are political by nature and some municipal employees are dismissed 
and/or suspended for political reasons. It would have been prudent for the legislators 
rather to have focused on requiring of municipalities to send all dismissals and or 
suspensions of municipal managers to the MEC in the province concerned. This should 
be similar to the provisions dealing with the Code of Conduct for Councillors105, which 
requires the Council to inform the MEC and to request for dismissal of councilors in 
certain instances.  
 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
  
Deputy Minister Carrim stated that there are clear problems at the political-administrative 
interface, and this is shown in the consistently high number of vacancies in management, 
suspension of managers, and acting appointments. A National Treasury presentation to 
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Parliament in 2008 showed that the number of vacancies in Municipal Manager and Chief 
Financial Officer positions increased dramatically in the six months immediately after the 
last municipal elections. According to the Deputy Minister, by December 2006, the 
vacancy rate for both positions stood at around 20%.106  
 
 While many of the legislative requirements appear to be in place, closer examination 
shows that, while there may be compliance with the letter of the law, the spirit is sorely 
lacking.   
 
Local government is being required to service more people with apparently fewer 
resources.  This is especially due to the legal imperative to provide free basic services 
but is also influenced by the growth in population and the proliferation of new 
developments. 
 
The majority of municipal staff, including CFO‟s and municipal managers, is suffering 
from exceptionally low morale as they have had to face many changes which are 
impacting on their ability to be effective leaders.   
 
Deputy Minister Carrim107 stressed that government is concerned about the high turnover 
of senior municipal managers, the suspension of senior managers for long periods on full 
pay, the tardiness of municipalities to process allegations against senior managers, the 
huge financial consequences for municipalities fighting dismissals and suspensions of 
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municipal officials in court and the unjustified huge pay-outs that officials receive. He 
emphasised that national government as well as the public are fed up108 with these 
manifestations. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study has tried to highlight the need to insulate the administration especially where 
constant political changes affect a municipality, however, this should not be seen as an 
endorsement of the protection of municipal officials that are corrupt, lazy, incompetent 
etc.  
 
The current legislative frameworks are an attempt by government to regulate the local 
government affairs, yet at times it appears that individuals are openly trying to flout these 
laws. The arrogance by some politicians and administrators in appointing cadres and 
flouting tender procedures are cause for concern and should be rooted out. The 
frameworks as policies will not have the desired effect on their own, and it is proposed 
that implementation should be non-negotiable and punishment for non-compliance 
should be severe. The framework goes a long way in curbing the re-appointment of 
officials at other municipalities; however, it does not address the re-emergence of 
politicians. Political parties should stand firm in their resolve to root out corruption and 
looting of state resources for personal gain, and should act harshly against politicians 
that deliberately and negligently makes themselves guilty of such tendencies. 
 
The State of Local Government in South Africa Overview Report paints a bleak picture of 
the current state of local government. This becomes even more problematic when 
considering the fact that most municipalities are still unable to submit credible audit 
reports. It is thus imperative that qualified and experienced administrators be appointed 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
without political affiliations. Coupled with this we require political leadership that is vigilant 
and keeps administrators accountable through its committees and council.    
 
The current legislative amendments on their own will not yield the required results unless 
it is followed up with vigorous implementation policies. It is recommended that the 
legislators should address the following amendments and enforce compliance to ensure 
that municipalities become more stable and the line is drawn between politicians and 
administrators. 
 
 Due to the constant changes in political leadership and their effect on the 
administration, it would be prudent to legislate coalitions as well as the number of 
times that municipal councils can change in five years; 
 
 Review legislation that allows the municipality to recommend the appointment, 
dismissal and/or suspension of municipal managers to the MEC in the province 
and for him/her to review the matter. This will be the same as when a municipality 
recommends for the dismissal and or suspension of a councillor, but where the 
final say remains with the MEC. 
 
 Removing the jurisdiction for the appointment of section 56 managers from the 
municipal council and allowing the municipal manager to make such 
appointments. This will minimise the effect of political appointments, nepotism and 
cronyism. 
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 Change the type of municipalities to executive committee systems, thereby 
allowing parties to be represented according to the wishes of the electorate. This 
will ensure that the wishes of the electorate are effected and parties are 
represented according to the number of votes received. 
 
We have just seen a round of amendments to the Systems Act and other initiatives by 
government, however there is no doubt that more should be done, and hopefully the 
abovementioned proposed changes to legislation should address some of these 
concerns that is bedeviling local government. Striking a balance between the 
administration and political leadership is vital to ensure the sustainability of municipalities. 
This in itself should transcend into better service delivery to the communities they serve. 
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